Much of Cabaniss’s recent thinking on semiconductors was shaped through his engagement with Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology by Chris Miller, a book he reviewed for the Marine Corps Gazette in early 2024. In that review, Cabaniss highlighted how semiconductor dominance has become central to global power competition.
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This stark concentration of production presents a profound challenge for national security. But, as Cabaniss pointed out in his review, even greater challenges lie ahead. “As the author clearly articulates, the resourcing requirements for chip development just for research and development are far beyond a single service or even the DoD as a whole.”
While Chip War “may be short on policy solutions—perhaps because the issues are so complex and cut across our entire economy—it does provide a much greater appreciation of how we got here and where we may be going,” Cabaniss concluded.
“Semiconductors are in almost everything we use today, from washing machines to jet planes,” Cabaniss notes. “But focusing only on where they’re fabricated ignores the broader web of relationships, industries, and infrastructure that make that production possible.”
Chips are not born fully formed out of silicon wafers. They pass through multiple specialized phases:
Design: where the U.S. leads the world
Fabrication: concentrated in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan
Packaging and testing: often done in China and outer countries in Southeast Asia
Supply chains for precursor materials and machinery: dominated by global firms, such as ASML in the Netherlands, which monopolizes the lithography machines used to etch cutting-edge chip designs
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Adopting an ecosystem mindset doesn’t mean abandoning efforts to build domestic capacity—it means expanding the conversation beyond it. According to Cabaniss, policymakers need to think in layers:
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Domestic design strength must be supported by ensuring access to fabrication, packaging, and testing resources.
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Domestic fabrication requires not just clean rooms and cutting-edge equipment, but workforce training and reliable power grids, both of which may take a decade or more to develop.
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Global supply chains must be mapped, monitored, and diversified where possible—not just at the first or second tier of suppliers, but deeper, where obscure precursor materials or single points of failure often hide.
4
Collaboration with allies and partners needs to move beyond general statements to specific, measurable commitments on technology sharing, security standards, and coordinated investments.
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While the CHIPS and Science Act has made strides in bolstering semiconductor capacity, it remains a first step, not a comprehensive solution. Defense policymakers should view it as part of a broader mosaic of actions required to safeguard both economic and national security interests.
For policymakers and defense leaders, the question is not just how many chips America can make, but whether we can build, protect, and sustain the entire ecosystem that brings them to life.
Explore Further
This is the first of a four-part series exploring the complex relationship between semiconductors and national security. Future posts will examine geopolitical risks, critical infrastructure gaps, and holistic strategies for resilience. Together, these posts aim to provide defense policy makers and industry leaders with a clearer picture of what is at stake – and why securing America’s semiconductor future requires a whole-of-nation approach. Subscribe to our once-weekly update to ensure you don’t miss a post.
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